""" This module contains several functions that authenticate the client machine with Telegram's servers, effectively creating an authorization key. """ import os import time from hashlib import sha1 from ..tl.types import ( ResPQ, PQInnerData, ServerDHParamsFail, ServerDHParamsOk, ServerDHInnerData, ClientDHInnerData, DhGenOk, DhGenRetry, DhGenFail ) from .. import helpers from ..crypto import AES, AuthKey, Factorization, rsa from ..errors import SecurityError from ..extensions import BinaryReader from ..tl.functions import ( ReqPqMultiRequest, ReqDHParamsRequest, SetClientDHParamsRequest ) async def do_authentication(sender): """ Executes the authentication process with the Telegram servers. :param sender: a connected `MTProtoPlainSender`. :return: returns a (authorization key, time offset) tuple. """ # Step 1 sending: PQ Request, endianness doesn't matter since it's random nonce = int.from_bytes(os.urandom(16), 'big', signed=True) res_pq = await sender.send(ReqPqMultiRequest(nonce)) assert isinstance(res_pq, ResPQ), 'Step 1 answer was %s' % res_pq if res_pq.nonce != nonce: raise SecurityError('Step 1 invalid nonce from server') pq = get_int(res_pq.pq) # Step 2 sending: DH Exchange p, q = Factorization.factorize(pq) p, q = rsa.get_byte_array(p), rsa.get_byte_array(q) new_nonce = int.from_bytes(os.urandom(32), 'little', signed=True) pq_inner_data = bytes(PQInnerData( pq=rsa.get_byte_array(pq), p=p, q=q, nonce=res_pq.nonce, server_nonce=res_pq.server_nonce, new_nonce=new_nonce )) # sha_digest + data + random_bytes cipher_text, target_fingerprint = None, None for fingerprint in res_pq.server_public_key_fingerprints: cipher_text = rsa.encrypt(fingerprint, pq_inner_data) if cipher_text is not None: target_fingerprint = fingerprint break if cipher_text is None: # Second attempt, but now we're allowed to use old keys for fingerprint in res_pq.server_public_key_fingerprints: cipher_text = rsa.encrypt(fingerprint, pq_inner_data, use_old=True) if cipher_text is not None: target_fingerprint = fingerprint break if cipher_text is None: raise SecurityError( 'Step 2 could not find a valid key for fingerprints: {}' .format(', '.join( [str(f) for f in res_pq.server_public_key_fingerprints]) ) ) server_dh_params = await sender.send(ReqDHParamsRequest( nonce=res_pq.nonce, server_nonce=res_pq.server_nonce, p=p, q=q, public_key_fingerprint=target_fingerprint, encrypted_data=cipher_text )) assert isinstance( server_dh_params, (ServerDHParamsOk, ServerDHParamsFail)),\ 'Step 2.1 answer was %s' % server_dh_params if server_dh_params.nonce != res_pq.nonce: raise SecurityError('Step 2 invalid nonce from server') if server_dh_params.server_nonce != res_pq.server_nonce: raise SecurityError('Step 2 invalid server nonce from server') if isinstance(server_dh_params, ServerDHParamsFail): nnh = int.from_bytes( sha1(new_nonce.to_bytes(32, 'little', signed=True)).digest()[4:20], 'little', signed=True ) if server_dh_params.new_nonce_hash != nnh: raise SecurityError('Step 2 invalid DH fail nonce from server') assert isinstance(server_dh_params, ServerDHParamsOk),\ 'Step 2.2 answer was %s' % server_dh_params # Step 3 sending: Complete DH Exchange key, iv = helpers.generate_key_data_from_nonce( res_pq.server_nonce, new_nonce ) if len(server_dh_params.encrypted_answer) % 16 != 0: # See PR#453 raise SecurityError('Step 3 AES block size mismatch') plain_text_answer = AES.decrypt_ige( server_dh_params.encrypted_answer, key, iv ) with BinaryReader(plain_text_answer) as reader: reader.read(20) # hash sum server_dh_inner = reader.tgread_object() assert isinstance(server_dh_inner, ServerDHInnerData),\ 'Step 3 answer was %s' % server_dh_inner if server_dh_inner.nonce != res_pq.nonce: raise SecurityError('Step 3 Invalid nonce in encrypted answer') if server_dh_inner.server_nonce != res_pq.server_nonce: raise SecurityError('Step 3 Invalid server nonce in encrypted answer') dh_prime = get_int(server_dh_inner.dh_prime, signed=False) g_a = get_int(server_dh_inner.g_a, signed=False) time_offset = server_dh_inner.server_time - int(time.time()) b = get_int(os.urandom(256), signed=False) gb = pow(server_dh_inner.g, b, dh_prime) gab = pow(g_a, b, dh_prime) # Prepare client DH Inner Data client_dh_inner = bytes(ClientDHInnerData( nonce=res_pq.nonce, server_nonce=res_pq.server_nonce, retry_id=0, # TODO Actual retry ID g_b=rsa.get_byte_array(gb) )) client_dh_inner_hashed = sha1(client_dh_inner).digest() + client_dh_inner # Encryption client_dh_encrypted = AES.encrypt_ige(client_dh_inner_hashed, key, iv) # Prepare Set client DH params dh_gen = await sender.send(SetClientDHParamsRequest( nonce=res_pq.nonce, server_nonce=res_pq.server_nonce, encrypted_data=client_dh_encrypted, )) nonce_types = (DhGenOk, DhGenRetry, DhGenFail) assert isinstance(dh_gen, nonce_types), 'Step 3.1 answer was %s' % dh_gen name = dh_gen.__class__.__name__ if dh_gen.nonce != res_pq.nonce: raise SecurityError('Step 3 invalid {} nonce from server'.format(name)) if dh_gen.server_nonce != res_pq.server_nonce: raise SecurityError( 'Step 3 invalid {} server nonce from server'.format(name)) auth_key = AuthKey(rsa.get_byte_array(gab)) nonce_number = 1 + nonce_types.index(type(dh_gen)) new_nonce_hash = auth_key.calc_new_nonce_hash(new_nonce, nonce_number) dh_hash = getattr(dh_gen, 'new_nonce_hash{}'.format(nonce_number)) if dh_hash != new_nonce_hash: raise SecurityError('Step 3 invalid new nonce hash') if not isinstance(dh_gen, DhGenOk): raise AssertionError('Step 3.2 answer was %s' % dh_gen) return auth_key, time_offset def get_int(byte_array, signed=True): """ Gets the specified integer from its byte array. This should be used by this module alone, as it works with big endian. :param byte_array: the byte array representing th integer. :param signed: whether the number is signed or not. :return: the integer representing the given byte array. """ return int.from_bytes(byte_array, byteorder='big', signed=signed)