Telethon/telethon/network/authenticator.py
2019-10-03 20:52:25 +02:00

190 lines
6.7 KiB
Python

"""
This module contains several functions that authenticate the client machine
with Telegram's servers, effectively creating an authorization key.
"""
import os
import time
from hashlib import sha1
from ..tl.types import (
ResPQ, PQInnerData, ServerDHParamsFail, ServerDHParamsOk,
ServerDHInnerData, ClientDHInnerData, DhGenOk, DhGenRetry, DhGenFail
)
from .. import helpers
from ..crypto import AES, AuthKey, Factorization, rsa
from ..errors import SecurityError
from ..extensions import BinaryReader
from ..tl.functions import (
ReqPqMultiRequest, ReqDHParamsRequest, SetClientDHParamsRequest
)
async def do_authentication(sender):
"""
Executes the authentication process with the Telegram servers.
:param sender: a connected `MTProtoPlainSender`.
:return: returns a (authorization key, time offset) tuple.
"""
# Step 1 sending: PQ Request, endianness doesn't matter since it's random
nonce = int.from_bytes(os.urandom(16), 'big', signed=True)
res_pq = await sender.send(ReqPqMultiRequest(nonce))
assert isinstance(res_pq, ResPQ), 'Step 1 answer was %s' % res_pq
if res_pq.nonce != nonce:
raise SecurityError('Step 1 invalid nonce from server')
pq = get_int(res_pq.pq)
# Step 2 sending: DH Exchange
p, q = Factorization.factorize(pq)
p, q = rsa.get_byte_array(p), rsa.get_byte_array(q)
new_nonce = int.from_bytes(os.urandom(32), 'little', signed=True)
pq_inner_data = bytes(PQInnerData(
pq=rsa.get_byte_array(pq), p=p, q=q,
nonce=res_pq.nonce,
server_nonce=res_pq.server_nonce,
new_nonce=new_nonce
))
# sha_digest + data + random_bytes
cipher_text, target_fingerprint = None, None
for fingerprint in res_pq.server_public_key_fingerprints:
cipher_text = rsa.encrypt(fingerprint, pq_inner_data)
if cipher_text is not None:
target_fingerprint = fingerprint
break
if cipher_text is None:
# Second attempt, but now we're allowed to use old keys
for fingerprint in res_pq.server_public_key_fingerprints:
cipher_text = rsa.encrypt(fingerprint, pq_inner_data, use_old=True)
if cipher_text is not None:
target_fingerprint = fingerprint
break
if cipher_text is None:
raise SecurityError(
'Step 2 could not find a valid key for fingerprints: {}'
.format(', '.join(
[str(f) for f in res_pq.server_public_key_fingerprints])
)
)
server_dh_params = await sender.send(ReqDHParamsRequest(
nonce=res_pq.nonce,
server_nonce=res_pq.server_nonce,
p=p, q=q,
public_key_fingerprint=target_fingerprint,
encrypted_data=cipher_text
))
assert isinstance(
server_dh_params, (ServerDHParamsOk, ServerDHParamsFail)),\
'Step 2.1 answer was %s' % server_dh_params
if server_dh_params.nonce != res_pq.nonce:
raise SecurityError('Step 2 invalid nonce from server')
if server_dh_params.server_nonce != res_pq.server_nonce:
raise SecurityError('Step 2 invalid server nonce from server')
if isinstance(server_dh_params, ServerDHParamsFail):
nnh = int.from_bytes(
sha1(new_nonce.to_bytes(32, 'little', signed=True)).digest()[4:20],
'little', signed=True
)
if server_dh_params.new_nonce_hash != nnh:
raise SecurityError('Step 2 invalid DH fail nonce from server')
assert isinstance(server_dh_params, ServerDHParamsOk),\
'Step 2.2 answer was %s' % server_dh_params
# Step 3 sending: Complete DH Exchange
key, iv = helpers.generate_key_data_from_nonce(
res_pq.server_nonce, new_nonce
)
if len(server_dh_params.encrypted_answer) % 16 != 0:
# See PR#453
raise SecurityError('Step 3 AES block size mismatch')
plain_text_answer = AES.decrypt_ige(
server_dh_params.encrypted_answer, key, iv
)
with BinaryReader(plain_text_answer) as reader:
reader.read(20) # hash sum
server_dh_inner = reader.tgread_object()
assert isinstance(server_dh_inner, ServerDHInnerData),\
'Step 3 answer was %s' % server_dh_inner
if server_dh_inner.nonce != res_pq.nonce:
raise SecurityError('Step 3 Invalid nonce in encrypted answer')
if server_dh_inner.server_nonce != res_pq.server_nonce:
raise SecurityError('Step 3 Invalid server nonce in encrypted answer')
dh_prime = get_int(server_dh_inner.dh_prime, signed=False)
g_a = get_int(server_dh_inner.g_a, signed=False)
time_offset = server_dh_inner.server_time - int(time.time())
b = get_int(os.urandom(256), signed=False)
gb = pow(server_dh_inner.g, b, dh_prime)
gab = pow(g_a, b, dh_prime)
# Prepare client DH Inner Data
client_dh_inner = bytes(ClientDHInnerData(
nonce=res_pq.nonce,
server_nonce=res_pq.server_nonce,
retry_id=0, # TODO Actual retry ID
g_b=rsa.get_byte_array(gb)
))
client_dh_inner_hashed = sha1(client_dh_inner).digest() + client_dh_inner
# Encryption
client_dh_encrypted = AES.encrypt_ige(client_dh_inner_hashed, key, iv)
# Prepare Set client DH params
dh_gen = await sender.send(SetClientDHParamsRequest(
nonce=res_pq.nonce,
server_nonce=res_pq.server_nonce,
encrypted_data=client_dh_encrypted,
))
nonce_types = (DhGenOk, DhGenRetry, DhGenFail)
assert isinstance(dh_gen, nonce_types), 'Step 3.1 answer was %s' % dh_gen
name = dh_gen.__class__.__name__
if dh_gen.nonce != res_pq.nonce:
raise SecurityError('Step 3 invalid {} nonce from server'.format(name))
if dh_gen.server_nonce != res_pq.server_nonce:
raise SecurityError(
'Step 3 invalid {} server nonce from server'.format(name))
auth_key = AuthKey(rsa.get_byte_array(gab))
nonce_number = 1 + nonce_types.index(type(dh_gen))
new_nonce_hash = auth_key.calc_new_nonce_hash(new_nonce, nonce_number)
dh_hash = getattr(dh_gen, 'new_nonce_hash{}'.format(nonce_number))
if dh_hash != new_nonce_hash:
raise SecurityError('Step 3 invalid new nonce hash')
if not isinstance(dh_gen, DhGenOk):
raise AssertionError('Step 3.2 answer was %s' % dh_gen)
return auth_key, time_offset
def get_int(byte_array, signed=True):
"""
Gets the specified integer from its byte array.
This should be used by this module alone, as it works with big endian.
:param byte_array: the byte array representing th integer.
:param signed: whether the number is signed or not.
:return: the integer representing the given byte array.
"""
return int.from_bytes(byte_array, byteorder='big', signed=signed)