CVE-2021-25287,CVE-2021-25288: Fix OOB Read in Jpeg2KDecode

CHANGES.rst

@@ -2,6 +2,14 @@
 Changelog (Pillow)
 ==================
 
+6.2.2.2 (date TBD)
+------------------
+
+- This is the second Pillow release to support Python 2.7 from ActiveState
+
+- Fix OOB Read in Jpeg2KDecode. CVE 2021-25287, CVE 2021-25288
+  [emilieyyu]
+  
 6.2.2.1 (2021-10-08)
 ------------------
 

Tests/test_file_jpeg2k.py

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ from PIL import Image, Jpeg2KImagePlugin
 
 from .helper import PillowTestCase
 
+import pytest
+
 codecs = dir(Image.core)
 
 test_card = Image.open("Tests/images/test-card.png")
@@ -210,3 +212,19 @@ class TestFileJpeg2k(PillowTestCase):
 
         # Assert
         self.assertEqual(p.image.size, (640, 480))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "test_file",
+    [
+        "Tests/images/crash-4fb027452e6988530aa5dabee76eecacb3b79f8a.j2k",
+        "Tests/images/crash-7d4c83eb92150fb8f1653a697703ae06ae7c4998.j2k",
+        "Tests/images/crash-ccca68ff40171fdae983d924e127a721cab2bd50.j2k",
+        "Tests/images/crash-d2c93af851d3ab9a19e34503626368b2ecde9c03.j2k",
+    ],
+)
+def test_crashes(test_file):
+    with open(test_file, "rb") as f:
+        with Image.open(f) as im:
+            # Valgrind should not complain here
+            im.load()

docs/releasenotes/6.2.2.2.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+6.2.2.2
+-------
+
+Security
+========
+
+This release addresses several critical CVEs.
+
+CVE 2021-25287, CVE 2021-25288 has out-of-bounds read in J2kDecode, in 
+j2ku_graya_la.

docs/releasenotes/index.rst

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Release Notes
 .. toctree::
   :maxdepth: 2
 
+  6.2.2.2
   6.2.2.1
   6.2.2
   6.2.1

src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c

@@ -557,8 +557,9 @@ j2k_decode_entry(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state)
     opj_dparameters_t params;
     OPJ_COLOR_SPACE color_space;
     j2k_unpacker_t unpack = NULL;
-    size_t buffer_size = 0;
-    unsigned n;
+    size_t buffer_size = 0, tile_bytes = 0;
+    unsigned n, tile_height, tile_width;
+    int total_component_width = 0;
 
     stream = opj_stream_create(BUFFER_SIZE, OPJ_TRUE);
 
@@ -703,6 +704,59 @@ j2k_decode_entry(Imaging im, ImagingCodecState state)
         tile_info.x1 = (tile_info.x1 + correction) >> context->reduce;
         tile_info.y1 = (tile_info.y1 + correction) >> context->reduce;
 
+        /* Check the tile bounds; if the tile is outside the image area,
+           or if it has a negative width or height (i.e. the coordinates are
+           swapped), bail. */
+        if (tile_info.x0 >= tile_info.x1 || tile_info.y0 >= tile_info.y1 ||
+            tile_info.x0 < 0 || tile_info.y0 < 0 ||
+            (OPJ_UINT32)tile_info.x0 < image->x0 ||
+            (OPJ_UINT32)tile_info.y0 < image->y0 ||
+            (OPJ_INT32)(tile_info.x1 - image->x0) > im->xsize ||
+            (OPJ_INT32)(tile_info.y1 - image->y0) > im->ysize) {
+            state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN;
+            state->state = J2K_STATE_FAILED;
+            goto quick_exit;
+        }
+
+        if (tile_info.nb_comps != image->numcomps) {
+            state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN;
+            state->state = J2K_STATE_FAILED;
+            goto quick_exit;
+        }
+
+        /* Sometimes the tile_info.datasize we get back from openjpeg
+           is less than sum(comp_bytes)*w*h, and we overflow in the
+           shuffle stage */
+
+        tile_width = tile_info.x1 - tile_info.x0;
+        tile_height = tile_info.y1 - tile_info.y0;
+
+        /* Total component width = sum (component_width) e.g, it's
+         legal for an la file to have a 1 byte width for l, and 4 for
+         a. and then a malicious file could have a smaller tile_bytes
+        */
+
+        for (n=0; n < tile_info.nb_comps; n++) {
+            // see csize /acsize calcs
+            int csize = (image->comps[n].prec + 7) >> 3;
+            csize = (csize == 3) ? 4 : csize;
+            total_component_width += csize;
+        }
+        if ((tile_width > UINT_MAX / total_component_width) ||
+            (tile_height > UINT_MAX / total_component_width) ||
+            (tile_width > UINT_MAX / (tile_height * total_component_width)) ||
+            (tile_height > UINT_MAX / (tile_width * total_component_width))) {
+            state->errcode = IMAGING_CODEC_BROKEN;
+            state->state = J2K_STATE_FAILED;
+            goto quick_exit;
+        }
+
+        tile_bytes = tile_width * tile_height * total_component_width;
+
+        if (tile_bytes > tile_info.data_size) {
+            tile_info.data_size = tile_bytes;
+        }
+
         if (buffer_size < tile_info.data_size) {
             /* malloc check ok, tile_info.data_size from openjpeg */
             UINT8 *new = realloc (state->buffer, tile_info.data_size);